Failure of the Filipino seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement within three days upon arrival must be for a justifiable reason or due to inadvertence/ deliberate refusal of the employer to refer the seafarer to a company-designated physician. Otherwise, such failure shall result in the forfeiture of his right to claim benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) .
In the recent case of Veronico Tagud vs. BSM Crew Service Center ( Gr. No. 219370, December 6, 2017), the Supreme Court reiterated that payment of disability
benefits to seafarers who failed to comply with the mandatory three-working days reporting and examination
requirement will be denied. Settled is the rule that the entitlement of seafarers to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract.
In the said case, the seafarer disembarked in Singapore and was repatriated to Manila on 8 November 2008. He ·alleged that he reported to his manning agency but was not given any assistance or referred to a company-designated physician. However, the court noted that the seafarer did not present any evidence to prove that he tried to submit himself to a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return. The seafarer did not also present any letter that he was physically incapacitated to see the company designated physician in order to be exempted from the rule. It took him about four months from repatriation or on 9 and 10 March 2009 to seek medical attention for pain in his upper right extremities, not from respondents' company-designated physician, but at a private clinic in Caloocan City. No other documents were submitted to prove that he asserted his rights against the company, or that he immediately took action to seek medical assistance from the company, within three days from his repatriation.
In the said case, the seafarer disembarked in Singapore and was repatriated to Manila on 8 November 2008. He ·alleged that he reported to his manning agency but was not given any assistance or referred to a company-designated physician. However, the court noted that the seafarer did not present any evidence to prove that he tried to submit himself to a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return. The seafarer did not also present any letter that he was physically incapacitated to see the company designated physician in order to be exempted from the rule. It took him about four months from repatriation or on 9 and 10 March 2009 to seek medical attention for pain in his upper right extremities, not from respondents' company-designated physician, but at a private clinic in Caloocan City. No other documents were submitted to prove that he asserted his rights against the company, or that he immediately took action to seek medical assistance from the company, within three days from his repatriation.
The Supreme Court held that the three-day
mandatory reporting requirement, whether to undergo a post-employment medical examination or report the seafarer's physical incapacity, must be strictly observed
since within three
days from repatriation, it would be fairly
manageable for the company-designated physician to identify whether the illness or injury was contracted during
the term of the seafarer's employment or that his working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment.( Heirs of the Late Delfin Dela Cruz v. PTC , 758 Phil.
382, 394-395)
It is the company-designated physician who is initially entrusted with the task of assessing the seafarer's disability, whether
total or
partial,
due to either injury or illness,
during the term of the latter's employment. Nevertheless, such assessment is not viewed
final, binding or conclusive on the claimant,
the labor tribunal or the courts. The seafarer has the prerogative to request a second opinion and to consult
a
physician of his choice regarding his ailment
or injury, in which case the medical
report issued by the latter shall be evaluated
by the labor tribunal and the court, based on its inherent merit.
Ascertaining the real cause of the illness or injury beyond the three-day period may prove difficult. To ignore the rule might set a precedent with negative repercussions, like opening floodgates to a limitless
number of seafarers
claiming disability benefits, or causing unfairness to the employer
who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness because of the passage
of time. ( Interorient
v. Creer, 735 SCRA 267.).
However, such requirement is not absolute
and admits of some exception, i.e., when
the seafarer is physically incapacitated from complying with the requirement.
Indeed, for a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical
attention one could not reasonably expect that he would immediately resort to
and avail of the required medical examination, assuming that he was still
capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time. (Wallem, Inc. v. Inductivo (376 Phil. 738)
The other exception to the three-day rule
is when failure to do so was not due to
the seafarer's fault but due to the inadvertence
or deliberate refusal of the employer to refer the seafarer to a company-designated
physician. (Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Leonora S. Remo, 622 SCRA
237).
Supreme
Court Associate Justice Marvic Leonen , in a separate opinion in the Interorient
vs. Creer case, said that there is
basis to revisit the scope of such a doctrine. He noted that current doctrine assumes
that seafarers will make claims only on the basis of breaches of contractual
obligations. While this may be the theory pursued in practice, substantive law
still allows recovery of damages for injuries suffered by the seafarer as a
result of a tortious violation on the part of the employer. This may be on the
basis of the provisions of the Civil Code as well as special laws. These
special laws may relate, among others, to environmental regulations and
requirements to ensure the reduction of risks to occupational hazards both for
the seafarer and the public in general. In such cases, the process for recovery
should not be constrained by contract. Second, even as a basis for contractual
breach, the exceptions provided in the POEA regulations and current
jurisprudence do not contemplate situations that may result in an unreasonable
denial of the constitutional protection to labor.
d
