Insanity and Suicide

Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder  that will  enable the heirs to be entitled   to death benefits for a seafarer who allegedly committed suicide. 

This was the ruling of the Supreme Court in  the recent case of Seapower Shipping vs. Heirs of Warren Sabanal (G .R. No. 198544,  June 19,2017)   where it denied the claim for death benefits as the heirs failed to prove that  cause of death of  the deceased seafarer is not  suicide. 

Under the  Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) standard employment contract,  the employer is generally liable for death compensation benefits when a seafarer dies during the term of employment. This rule, however, is not absolute. Part II, Section C(6) of the  contract  exempts the employer from liability if it can successfully prove that the seafarer's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.

       The question presented  is whether the exemption extends to the case when the seafarer had been acting strangely prior to jumping into the sea.

       Evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a matter of counter-defense. But the burden of evidence is then shifted to the claimant to prove that the seafarer was of unsound mind. 

 The seafarer's strange behavior alone is insufficient to prove his insanity. Without proof that his mental condition negated the voluntariness he showed in stepping overboard, the seafarer's case is still considered suicide. 

Since the willfulness may be inferred from the physical act itself of the seafarer (his jump into the open sea), the insanity or mental illness required to be proven must be one that deprived him of the full control of his senses; in other words, there must be sufficient proof to negate voluntariness. 

The heirs  did not present any evidence to support   their  claim that  the seafarer  was already insane when he jumped overboard.  The heirs  only relied on the strange behavior of the deceased seafarer  as detailed by the ship captain in the ship log and master's report. However,  while such behavior may be indicative of a possible mental disorder, it is insufficient to prove that the deceased seafarer  had lost full control of his faculties. 

   In order for insanity to prosper as a counter-defense, the claimant must substantially prove that the seafarer suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act or complete absence of the power to discern the consequences of his action. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties does not foreclose willfulness. In fact, the ship log shows the deceased seafarer was still able to correct maps and type the declarations of the crew hours before he jumped overboard. The captain observed that the deceased seafarer did not appear to have any problems while performing these simple tasks, while the seafarer -on-guard reported that the deceased seafarer  did not show any signs of unrest immediately before the incident. These circumstances, coupled with the legal presumption of sanity tend to belie  the heir's  claim that the deceased seafarer  no longer exercised any control over his own senses and mental faculties

 The Court  cited a related case, Crewlink, Inc. v. Teringtering (G.R. No. 166803, October 11, 2012), where it ruled that  the claimant presented no evidence, witness, or any medical report to support the claim of insanity other than  bare allegations that the seafarer was suffering from a mental disorder . The  explained  that:

"Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of [a deceased seafarer] requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness' own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim"

Gambling as a ground for dismissal

Gambling is one of  the twenty one (21) offenses which are considered valid grounds for dismissal under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration- Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), which covers any  of the following acts: 

a. gambling which results in fighting or any incident as to upset the harmonious relationship on board the ship

b. any other form of gambling which is not purely recreational.  

Filipino  seafarers  have a penchant for gambling even at a very early age. They have the tendency to play or gamble anytime and anywhere. Family celebrations and funeral wakes are never complete without mahjong,  poker, bingo sessions. pusoy, pekwa, etc. This fondness for gambling is carried over to sea by Filipino seafarers.

Gambling can have relaxational and recreational purposes for Filipino seafarers if properly regulated and managed. They should gamble only with their excess money; thus the bets should not be large. The officers should fix and delimit the site or area and time wherein the gambling  games may be played. Troubles arising through gambling must be prevented by the officers by their proper supervision of it. 

Recreational gambling or social gambling refers to someone who gambles for fun. It does not result in any negative consequences for the person in terms of time and money spent. They play occasionally, taking account of their financial limits and knowing how to end the game in a controlled way. They accept that they might lose money and do not play on in order to recover their losses. 

Not all gambling can  lead to one's termination. The Court  stressed in Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. NLRC (260 SCRA 49)  that  “a grave injustice is committed in the name of justice when the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the wrong committed.  To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.” There is no question that the employer has the inherent right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees for just causes.  This right is, however, subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. The finding of the NLRC that an employee violated company rules and regulations is subject to scrutiny by the Court to determine if the dismissal is justified and, if so, whether the penalty imposed is commensurate to the gravity of the offense (Associated Labor Unions-TUCP et al vs. NLRC, 302 SCRA 708). 

Even when an employee is found to have transgressed the employer’s rules, in the actual imposition of penalties upon the erring employee, due consideration must still be given to his length of service and the number of violations committed during his employ. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice,  whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment (PLDT vs. NLRC , 303 SCRA 9). 

When a seafarer commits such acts of unwanted  gambling , he may be penalized by the master of the vessel with dismissal and be made to pay the cost of repatriation and his replacement. Additionally, an administrative complaint or disciplinary action against the seafarer may be filed before the POEA, who,  after due investigation, may  impose penalties ranging from suspension  to  delisting, depending on the frequency of the violation(s).

Under the "two-notice rule", an erring seafarer is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings (Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira 440 Phil. 906 (2002)

In case of an  illegal dismissal,  a seafarer is  entitled to receive from his employers His salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract not merely  his salaries for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term.

It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to discharge this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence, which is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures (MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., vs. TORIBIO C. A VESTRUZ,, G.R. No. 207010   February 18, 2015

The 120/240 day rule on seafarer's disability cases

The number of days under medication is a significant element in determining the disability benefits of  a seafarer who was a medically repatriated.  

The  seafarer's standard employment contract of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)    enumerates under Section 20(A)(3) the three classes of benefits the seafarers are entitled to if the illness or injury is considered as work connected:

  (a)     sickness allowance not to exceed 120 days of  basic wage.

 (b)     medical expenses until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been    established by the company-designated physician.

  (c)     compensation in accordance with the    schedule of benefits governed by the rates and the rules        of compensation. 

In many instances, the period within which the company-designated physician  issues a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading is a contentious factor  in the determination of compensation due to the seafarer. 

The  Supreme Court  laid down (Elburg Shipmgt.  Phils vs. Ernesto Quiogue, G.R. No. 211882, July 29, 2015)     the following guidelines that shall govern seafarers' claims for permanent and total disability benefits:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

Under the prevailing doctrine on disability claims of Filipino seafarers. when the company-designated physician makes an assessment of the seafarer’s disability rating within the period of 120 days from medical repatriation, such assessment becomes final. 

The additional 120 days (or a total of 240 days) from repatriation is given to the company-designated physician to provide further treatment to the seafarer and, “thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability.”


Failure to obtain any gainful employment for more than 120 days after his medical repatriation, or inability to continue his work as a seaman for the same period does not mean that a seafarer’s disability should be considered permanent and total.

The  Supreme Court further clarified that for the company-designated physician to avail of the extended 240-day period, he must first perform some significant act to justify an extension (e.g., that the illness still requires medical attendance beyond the initial 120 days but not to exceed 240 days); otherwise, the seafarer's disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent and total. (Jebsens Maritime, et.al. v. Florvin Rapiz (G.R. No. 218871. January 11, 2017)

A seafarer is considered as  suffering permanent total disability if the medical statement of the company doctor  is  devoid of any definitive declaration as to the seafarer's  capacity  to return to work or at least a categorical and final degree of disability.

There is no "definitive assessment" where the company-designated physician noted that seafarer's wound was still open and that he was to continue his medications  (Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc G.R. No. 203804, April 15, 2015) If he fails to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.(Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. v. Balasta,  G.R. No. 193047, March 3, 2014, 717 SCRA 624, 626) 

Such principle is more apparent in  event that  the seafarer  has remained unemployed as a seafarer for more than 240 days from the time of his repatriation  or he was unable to perform the same physical activities he used to perform prior to his injury.  ( Belchem Phils./UPL  vs. Eduardo  Zafra G.R. No. 204845               June 15, 2015) 

A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it.   (Fil-Star Maritime Corp., et.al. vs. Hanziel Rosete, G.R. No. 192686, November 23, 2011), Permanent disability is the inability of the worker to perform his job , regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. (Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.,  vs. Benedicto Suganob, G.R. No. 168753, July 9, 2008,  )

*

Prescription in filing cases

The prescriptive period under the pre-2000  contract is one year from the date of the seafarer's return to the point of hire. Under the 2000 contract, prescription is three years from the date the cause of action arises.17 This harmonizes the contract with the Philippine Labor Code, which allows for a three-year prescriptive period

As a general rule,  the seafarer  is only allowed to recover any and all monetary claims within a period of three years from the date the cause of action accrues. The exception is illegal dismissal cases which can be filed within four years.

Employees have 3 years to recover their monetary claims arising out of employment.

The employee is only allowed to recover any and all monetary claims within a period of three years from the date the cause of action accrues. This so provided in the Labor Code, viz:

Article 305. MONEY CLAIMS

All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this [Labor] Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred…

Thus, any monetary claim beyond the 3-year period will no longer be enforceable. Beyond the 3-year period, the employee cannot anymore recover as they are “forever barred”

cause of action 

The Labor Code does not provide for a provision on when the counting will start. It simply states that money claims become due “from the time the cause of action accrued.” A cause of action accrues only when “the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty.”[4]

A cause of action consists of three elements.

… a cause of action has three elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.

It bears stressing that it is only when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises…[5]

Thus, the counting will vary depending on when the employer denied the employee’s monetary claim. Consequently, even if the monetary claim is beyond 3 years from the formal demand but there is no denial thereof within that time, the employee may still recover the monetary claims within the prescriptive period after the employer finally makes a denial.

… [the employee] repeatedly demanded payment from respondent Maersk [on different dates earlier than the October 1993 letter], respondent Maersk warded off these demands by saying that it would look into the matter until years passed by. In October 1993, Serrano finally demanded in writing payment of the unsent money orders. Then and only then was the claim categorically denied by respondent A.P. Moller in its letter dated November 22, 1993. … [the employee’s] cause of action accrued only upon respondent A.P. Moller’s definite denial of his claim in November 1993. Having filed his action five (5) months thereafter or in April 1994, we hold that it was filed within the three-year (3) prescriptive period provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code.Serrano v. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc., G.R. No. 139420, 15 April 2001.

prescriptive period to be applied should be three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued in accordance with the Labor Code.

The dispute is the period of prescription of action for illegal dismissal. It will be noticed that in their Motion to Dismiss before the NLRC, petitioners allege that the prescriptive period to be applied should be three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued in accordance with the Labor Code. However, in their petition before this Court, they changed their stand and alleged that the applicable provision should be that which is stated in the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen because seafarers are not regular employees and as such, are not covered by the Labor Code.

In Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.,[13] this Court ruled that actions based on injury to rights prescribe in four (4) years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code rather than three (3) years as provided for the Labor Code. An action for damages involving a plaintiff separated from his employment for alleged unjustifiable causes is one for injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought within four (4) years.[14] Private respondent had gone to the Labor Arbiter on a charge, fundamentally, of illegal dismissal, of which his money claims form but an incidental part. Essentially, his complaint is one for injury to rights arising from his forced disembarkation.[15] Thus, Article 1146 is the applicable provision. It provides:

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that ones employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.[16] The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law.[17]Clearly then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of ones dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four (4) years.[18]

 Teekay Shipping Phils., Inc. and/or Teekay Shipping Canada vs. Ramier Concha ; G.R. No.185463; Second Division ; February 22,2012 ; Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, Ponente

The day the action may be brought is the day a claim starts as a legal possibilityAnabe v. Asian Construction, G.R. No. 183233, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 213, 221.

As in other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is subject to interruption, and in view of the absence of an equivalent Labor Code provision for determining when said period may be interrupted, Article 1155 of the Civil Code is applicable. It states that:

Article 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the Court, when there is written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

Records reveal that after his disembarkation from the vessel MV Kyushu Spirit on 6 December 2000, private respondent filed on 28 May 2001 a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. His complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on the same date. In accordance with Section 16, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure[19], private respondent can re-file a case in the Arbitration Branch of origin. Since the filing of his first complaint on 28 May 2001 tolled the running of the period of prescription, both the NLRC and the CA were correct in ruling that the filing of respondents second complaint with money claims on 13 December 2004 was clearly filed on time. 

Cadalin vs. POEA Administrator, we held that Article 291 covers all moneys claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in scope that claims arising from a specific law.  It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.  Article 291 provides that all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise, these shall forever be barred.  A cause of action accrues upon the categorical denial of claim.  (Seafarer's) cause of action accrued on January 6, 1998, when Avantgarde denied his claim and so breached its obligation to (seafarer).  (Seafarer) could not have a cause of action prior to this because his earlier requests were warded off by indefinite promises.  The complaint filed on March 2, 2001 is beyond the three-year prescriptive period Lauro C. Degamo vs. Avantgarde Shipping Corp. et. al., G.R. No. 154460, November 22, 2005

Under Article 391 of the Civil Code, a missing seafarer can be declared legally dead only after a four year waiting period.  The three year prescriptive period must be counted from the end of the four year waiting period.  Thus, the filing of the complaint in six years is within the prescriptive period (four year waiting period plus the three year prescriptive period.) Imelda Pantollano vs. Korphil Shipmanagement, G.R. No. 169575, First Division, April 5, 2011

Insubordination as a ground for dismissal

Insubordination is one of  the twenty one (21) offenses which are considered valid grounds for dismissal under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration- Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), which covers any  of the following acts: 

a.  any act of disobedience to  lawful orders of a superior officer

b.  attempting to assault a superior officer
c.  assaulting a superior officer/other persons on  business with the ship without the use of deadly weapon

 d. assaulting a superior officer/other persons on business with the ship with the use of deadly weapon

e. behaving with disrespect  towards a superior officer

f.  insulting a superior officer by words or deed

g. inciting another to commit  insubordination

Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of a seafarer, necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the seafarer's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the seafarer, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. (MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., vs. TORIBIO C. A VESTRUZ,, G.R. No. 207010 , February 18, 2015)

Some incidents, which in the normal course of events may  occur one way or another, are  not synonymous to  “insubordination” and “willful disobedience” that are punishable by dismissal    as normally erroneously imputed by the  companies  to seafarers. 

Not every case of insubordination or willful disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-connected order of the employer or its representative is reasonably penalized with dismissal. There must be reasonable proportionality between, on the one hand, the willful disobedience by the employee and , on the other hand,  the penalty imposed therefor (Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. NLRC (189 SCRA 811)”. For misconduct to be considered serious, it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant (Austria vs. NLRC, 312 SCRA 410).

The Court likewise stressed in Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. NLRC (260 SCRA 49)  that  “a grave injustice is committed in the name of justice when the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the wrong committed.  To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.” There is no question that the employer has the inherent right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees for just causes.  This right is, however, subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. The finding of the NLRC that an employee violated company rules and regulations is subject to scrutiny by the Court to determine if the dismissal is justified and, if so, whether the penalty imposed is commensurate to the gravity of the offense (Associated Labor Unions-TUCP et al vs. NLRC, 302 SCRA 708). 

Even when an employee is found to have transgressed the employer’s rules, in the actual imposition of penalties upon the erring employee, due consideration must still be given to his length of service and the number of violations committed during his employ. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice,  whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment (PLDT vs. NLRC , 303 SCRA 9). 

When a seafarer commits such act, he may be penalized by the master of the vessel with dismissal and be made to pay the cost of repatriation and his replacement. Additionally, an administrative complaint or disciplinary action against the seafarer may be filed before the POEA, who,  after due investigation, may  impose penalties ranging from suspension  to  delisting, depending on the frequency of the violation(s).

Under the "two-notice rule", an erring seafarer is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings (Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira 440 Phil. 906 (2002)

In case of an  illegal dismissal,  a seafarer is  entitled to receive from his employers His salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract not merely  his salaries for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term.

It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to discharge this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence, which is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures (MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., vs. TORIBIO C. A VESTRUZ,, G.R. No. 207010   February 18, 2015

Telefax transmission or emails purportedly executed and signed by a person on board the vessel, like the captain or any officer,  is insufficient evidence to prove the commission of the acts constituting the grounds for the dismissal of  seafarers, being uncorroborated evidence. (Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. v. Ranay, 341 Phil. 716 (1997).