The Supreme Court warned companies from issuing dubious Certificate of
Fitness which it described as “a ploy that aims to take advantage of the
worker’s lack of sufficient legal knowledge and his desperate circumstances”
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of a young seafarer who
sought payment of permanent total disability
benefits for contracting bipolar disorder during his employment,
an illness that was declared work-related and aggravated by the harsh treatment
he received from the
ship officers (Career Shipmanagement vs. Eduardo Godinez, G.R. No. 206826,
October 2, 2017)
The supreme Court emphasized the circumstances on how the alleged Certificate
of Fitness for Work was executed by the
seafarer (during the medication process) and was used by the company to serve
as proof of his state of health in an effort to deny his claims for total
disability benefits.
The
court considered the seafarer’s declaration as not competent since he is not a trained physician, and it cannot take the place of the
company-designated physician’s assessment required by law and the POEA contract
The Court warns against the continued use of underhanded tactics that
undermine the interests of labor, damages the integrity of the legal
profession, mock the judicial process as a whole, and insult the intelligence
of the Court. In prosecuting a client’s
case, the Court reminded the company’s counsels that there are multiple ways of
securing victory, other than through fabrication, prevarication, and guile.
The manner in which the seafarer was dealt with in the proceedings, the Court
emphasized, evinces a perverse attempt
to evade liability by fabricating evidence and utilizing objectionable and
oppressive means and schemes to secure victory.
It constitutes an affront, not only to the Court, but to all honest
workingmen earning a living through hard work and risking their lives for their
families.
In a related case, the fact that a
Certification of Fitness was executed, it should no also t be considered as a
bar in seafarer’s availment of second medical opinion from his personal doctor
and later to seek relief from a legal forum.
In labor jurisprudence, it is
well-established that quitclaims and/or complete releases executed by the
employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims arising from the unfair
labor practice of the employer. The basic reason for this is that such
quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and, therefore,
null and void. The acceptance of termination pay does not divest a laborer of
the right to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts.
In the Cariño vs. ACCFA case (L-19808,
Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183) , the Supreme Court said
"acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The reason is
plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. The
employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of
money. Because, out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He
thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a
case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners
did not relent their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived
any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur."
In More Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC
(366 Phil. 646,
653-654), the Court ruled that
the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation
than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding
benefits to which he is entitled. Quitclaims executed by the employees are thus
commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar
claims for the full measure of the worker's legal rights, considering the
economic disadvantage of the employee and the inevitable pressure upon him by
financial necessity. Thus, it is never enough to assert that the parties have
voluntarily entered into such a quitclaim. There are other requisites, to wit:
(a) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (b)
that the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (c)
that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
This principle was utilized In the case of Var-orient Shipping
Co. vs. Flores (October 6, 2010
G.R. No. 161934 when the Supreme Court took cognizance
of the illegality of the Certification of Fitness to Work. It noted that the Receipt and Quitclaim
executed by the seafarer lacks the elements of voluntariness and free
will and, therefore, does not absolve employers from liability in paying
him the sickness wages and other monetary claims. A perusal of the provisions
of the Receipt and Quitclaim shows that seafarer would be releasing and
discharging the employers from all claims, demands, causes of action, and
the like in an all-encompassing manner, including the fact that he had not
contracted or suffered any illness or injury in the course of his employment
and that he was discharged in good and perfect health. These stipulations
clearly placed the seafarer in a disadvantageous position vis-á-vis the
employers .
The certificate of fitness to
work executed by a seafarer cannot
prevail in the labor cases since the
worker, untrained in the
medical arts, is not in possession of sufficient knowledge to expertly asses
his true and correct health status. For while a person can assess his general
health, he cannot do so with respect to his medical condition which undoubtedly
require a trained man learned in the medical arts, to properly diagnose and
treat. It could not be said that a layman possess the requisite level of
knowledge and expertise which took years of learning and experience for a
trained cardiologist to acquire. Therefore, the act of preying upon the ignorance of the
petitioner must not be countenanced by our labor courts
Moreover,
it must be stressed that the POEA SEC recognizes the right of seafarers to seek
a second opinion to contest the certification issued by the company doctor, in
this case, the “fit to work” certification. To insist that the seafarer is
barred from seeking opinion is tantamount to a violation of the POEA SEC’s
terms and conditions.
Cariño vs. ACCFA, L-19808, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183; Philippine Sugar
Institute vs. CIR, L-13475, Sept. 29, 1960, 109 Phil. 452; Mercury Drug Co. vs.
CIR, L-23357, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 694, 704.
