Tuberculosis among seafarers

Seafarers by nature of their work are exposed to a variety of occupational hazards making exposure to biological agents and the concomitant risk of communicable diseases extremely  high.

Because of their nature of work, seafarers are bound to visit many ports in different parts of the world and are thus exposed to various pandemic and epidemic diseases such as tuberculosis.

In Inter-Orient Maritime  vs. Creer (G.R. No. 181921 September 17, 2014) , the Supreme Court pointed out that pulmonary tuberculosis is airborne and easily transmissible by infected patients. The risk of being infected, or acquiring, the tuberculosis infection is mainly determined by exogenous factors. 

The probability of contact with a case of tuberculosis, the intimacy and duration of that contact, the degree of infectiousness of the case, and the shared environment of the contact are all important determinants of transmission.

On the other hand, the risk of developing the disease after being infected is largely dependent on endogenous factors. The tuberculosis bacteria may lie dormant in the infected person’s immune system for years before it becomes reactivated, or he may ultimately develop the disease within the first year or two after infection, depending on the innate susceptibility to disease of the person and level of immunity.

In ruling for the compensability of tuberculosis, the Supreme Court held in the case of BARKO vs. Alcayno (G.R. No. 188190               April 21, 2014) that  a certification declaring the seafarer  as fit to work contrary to a prior finding of tuberculosis can be considered as a ploy to circumvent the law intended to defeat the seafarer’s  right to be compensated for a disability which the law considers as permanent and total.

The Supreme Court  explained that tuberculosis is a contagious infection caused by the airborne bacterium Mycobacterium tuberculosis. It is usually transmitted by inhaling air contaminated by the bacterium. Active tuberculosis usually begins in the lungs (pulmonary tuberculosis). Tuberculosis that affects other part of the body (extrapulmonary tuberculosis) usually comes from pulmonary tuberculosis that has spread through the blood. Tuberculosis adenitis is a form of tuberculosis which affects the lymph nodes. 

The court noted that under the  POEA contract, "Pulmonary Tuberculosis" shall be considered as an occupational disease in "any occupation involving constant exposure to harmful substances in the working environment in the form of gases, fumes, vapors and dust."

The seafarer’s daily tasks as an able bodied seaman were to paint and chip rust on deck or superstructure of ship and to give directions to crew engaged in cleaning wheelhouse and quarterdeck, which constantly exposed him to different types of hazardous chemicals, such as paints, thinners, and other forms of cleaning agents and harmful substances, that may have invariably contributed to the aggravation of his illness.

The Supreme Court noted the suspicious  gesture of the company in having a medical certification declaring him as "fit to work" despite apparent clear knowledge that he has been subjected to a long period of medical treatment.

For a sick  seafarer to be entitled to medical benefits under the  POEA Contract,  it is not sufficient to simply establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted .

TB bacteria most commonly grow in the lungs, and can cause symptoms such as a bad cough that lasts three  weeks or longer, pain in the chest and coughing up blood or sputum (mucus from deep inside the lungs). Other symptoms of TB disease may include weakness or fatigue, weight loss, no appetite, chills, fever, and sweating at night.

Since one of the requirement for an illness to be compensable is that the seafarer suffered said illness during the effectivity of the POEA contract, it is imperative that his condition or symptoms  must be documented while he is on board the vessel.

Otherwise, his claim for disability benefits might be denied due to failure to prove that said illness occurred while his contract is still in force.

(Atty. Gorecho heads the seafarers’ division of the  Sapalo Velez Bundang Bulilan  law offices. For comments, email info@sapalovelez.com, or call 09175025808 or 09088665786)

Spine injuries at sea

Back pains or spine injuries or illnesses are inherent in a seafarer’s  job characterized by excessive and strenuous physical activities, such as lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling and moving heavy equipment and materials.

The injury or illness may occur over a period of time or on the spot depending upon the physical strength and posture of the workers as well.   

The common back injuries or illness include lumbar spondylosis, lumbar radiculopathy, multi-level disc dessication, posterior disc herniation, or canal stenosis.

In compensation  claims, employers usually  argue that the nature of disability and the benefits are determined by the manner they are graded or classified under the POEA contract and not by the number of days that a seafarer is under treatment.  If a seafarer has an injury or medical condition that is not considered a Grade 1 impediment, then he cannot claim that he is totally or permanently disabled. To allow the contrary, they argue, would render naught the schedule of disabilities.

Under the POEA contract, Grade 1 disability grading will be given if a seafarer suffered  injury to the spinal cord  if (a) it  makes walking impossible even with the aid of a pair of crutches or (b) results to incontinence of urine and feces.

Partial disability  benefits will be given if the assessment is as follows: (a) Grade 4 if it caused walking impossible without the aid of a pair of crutches; (b) Grade 6  if he suffered fracture of the dorsal or lumber spines resulting severe or total rigidity of the trunk or total loss of lifting power of heavy objects ; (c) Grade 8 if he  suffered moderate rigidity or two thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk; and (d) Grade 11 if he  suffered slight rigidity or one third (1/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk.

In some instances, any seafarer who suffered these  medical conditions is in essence should be declared total permanent disabled, and not merely partial temporary. The findings and the disability grading of a company-designated physician could be set aside in the determination of disability compensation.

The  Supreme Court  usually considers the glaring apparent inconsistency in the company doctor's medical report between the classification of seafarer's disability and the fact that he had been unable to work for long period of time, which condition makes his disability permanent and total. (Crystal Shipping, Inc. vs. Natividad, 473 SCRA 559).

Permanent total disability means disablement of a seafarer to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. Disability need not render the seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be compensable; it is enough that it incapacitates to perform his customary work. (Seagull Maritime Corporation vs. Dee, 520 SCRA 109).  

If those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally or permanently disabled (Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 689 SCRA 795)

Companies cannot deny the fact that a seafarer suffering from any of these medical conditions will be considered more of a liability than an asset if he is allowed to go on board the vessel.He would no longer be able to perform strenuous activities such as the rigorous duties of a seafarer.

The Supreme Court acknowledge that  symptoms following surgery are relieved only to recur after a variable period. The causes may include insufficient removal of disc material and further extrusion, rupture of another disc, adhesions about the nerve root and formation of an osteophyte at the site of removal of bone. Even a successful disc removal  does not guarantee a permanent cure as fibrosis can produce a dense constricting scar tissue, which is presumed to be a prime cause of recurrent symptoms(NFD . v. Illescas, G.R. No. 183054, September 29, 2010.)

Surgery can never stop the pathological process nor restore the back to its previous state. Similar poor results have been found with repeated attempts at surgical intervention for the relief of chronic low back pain. If long term relief is desired, continued mechanical stress of postural or occupational type must be avoided.

Resuming a seafarer’s  usual work, which includes increased loading, twisting, or bending and extension of the back, will further expose him  to dangers of  aggravating his medical condition. 

(Atty. Gorecho heads the seafarers’ division of the  Sapalo Velez Bundang Bulilan  law offices. For comments, email info@sapalovelez.com, or call 09175025808 or 09088665786)

Post-contract death and medical records on board the vessel

A seafarer’s  illness which caused his post-repatriation death must be properly  documented  during the term of his contract in relation to death compensation benefits. 

As a general rule, the death of the seafarer  should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract in order for the employer to be  liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. 

Under the  POEA approved employment contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. The amount usually is higher if the death is covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)

 

In Medline Management, Inc. vs. Gliceria Roslinda  (September 15, 2010,  G.R. No. 168715) , the  Supreme Court dismissed the claims for death benefits because  there is no evidence to show that the seafarer’s  illness was acquired during the term of his employment with the company.  

 The seafarer's contract of employment ceased when he was discharged on January 20, 2000, after having completed his contract. He died on August 27, 2001 or one year, seven months and seven days after the expiration of his contract.

The seafarer   did not die while he was under the employ of his employers.The heirs admitted that the seafarer  was discharged not because of any illness but due to the expiration of his employment contract,  Although they stated that  was hospitalized on August 28, 1999, or five months before his contract expired, they presented no proof to support this allegation. Instead, what the heirs  presented were the Medical Certificates  attesting to the fact that  the seafarer  consulted a doctor  complaining of abdominal distention three months after his repatriation.  

The Court noted that this is  not substantial evidence to prove that the seafarer’s  illness which caused his death was contracted during the term of his contract. There should be proper documentation of the seafarer's medical condition while he is on board the vessel. 

The Court stressed that the death of a seafarer  several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that: a) the seafarer  died of the same illness; b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise. 

The  Court noted that  the seafarer  was repatriated not because of any illness but because his contract of employment expired. There is likewise no proof that he contracted his illness during the term of his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death.

The Supreme Court  ruled in  later  case that while it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the seafarer's contract of employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes the proximate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had. (Heirs of the late Edwin Deauna vs.  FilStar Maritime Corp.,  G.R. No. 191563 June 20, 2012)

At the time of the seafarer' s death on April 13, 2006 due to Glioblastoma, he was still in the employment of the company. While it is true that  the contract considers a seafarer as terminated when he signs off from the vessel due to sickness, a seafarer remains under the company's employ as long as the former is still entitled to medical assistance and sick pay, and provided that the death which eventually occurs is directly attributable to the sickness which caused the seafarer's employment to be terminated.

Employing the spirit of liberality, the Court  recognized that a medical repatriation case constitutes an exception to the second requirement under Section 20 (A) (1) of the POEA contract, i.e., that the seafarer's death had occurred during the term of his employment, in view of the terminative consequences of a medical repatriation.

 In essence, the Court held that under such circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his employment as it is enough that the seafarer's work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment.

Filipino seafarers are not probationary employees

Filipino seafarers are  not probationary employees in connection with dismissal cases.  

In  Dante de la Cruz vs. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.  (G.R. No. 172038 April 14, 2008)  the company insisted that the dismissal of the seafarer is proper as he  was then still on probationary status. This  entitled them to dismiss him in accordance with the provisions of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which allows the master to terminate the contract of one under probation by merely serving a written notice 14 days prior to the contemplated discharge.  

       The Supreme Court explained that seafarers are not covered by the term regular employment, as defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code (Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission. 312 Phil 1137)

 Instead, they are considered contractual employees whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen (POEA Standard Employment Contract), the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and, more importantly, by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

 Even the POEA Standard Employment Contract itself mandates that in no case shall a contract of employment concerning seafarer exceed 12 months.

        It is an accepted maritime industry practice that the employment of seafarers is for a fixed period only. The Court acknowledges this to be for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer. Seafarers cannot stay for a long and indefinite period of time at sea as limited access to shore activity during their employment has been shown to adversely affect them. Furthermore, the diversity in nationality, culture and language among the crew necessitates the limitation of the period of employment.

The Court noted that the CBA cannot override the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The law is read into, and forms part of, contracts. And provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

In Millares v. NLRC (434 Phil 524),   the  Court had occasion to rule on the use of the terms “permanent and probationary masters and employees” vis-à-vis contracts of enlistment of seafarers. In that case, petitioners made much of the fact that they were continually re-hired for 20 years by  the company . By such circumstances, they claimed to have acquired regular status with all the rights and benefits appurtenant thereto.  The reference to permanent and probationary masters and employees was a misnomer. It did not change the fact that the contract for employment was for a definite period of time. In using the terms “probationary” and “permanent” vis-à-vis seafarers, what was really meant was “eligible for re-hire.”

(Atty. Gorecho heads the seafarers’ division of the  Sapalo Velez Bundang Bulilan  law offices. For comments, email info@sapalovelez.com, or call 09175025808 or 09088665786)

Seafarer’s loans and prohibited recruitment acts

Despite the perceived high income they receive, it becomes difficult for some Filipino  seafarers  to make the earnings last for the period of vacation and examinations, which in recent times can be inordinately long.

Not all seafarers have the privilege of getting redeployed  immediately after their disembarkation making it  problematic to have any cash reserves.

Difficult times and immediate need for money will lead  seafarers to people known as loan sharks to be able to finance certain expenses.

                   

Loan sharks can be a person or entity that allows you to borrow a certain amount of money and charge with higher interest rate, usually above established legal rates. They are also illegal financing companies that usually targets people who are in desperate need of money

Taking advantage of such situation,  there are  employers or manning agencies that  impose  a compulsory and exclusive arrangement whereby a seafarer is required to avail of a loan from a specifically designated institution, entity, or person.

Such act is  considered as one of the prohibited acts    under the Amended Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (AMWA) or  R.A.  No. 10022 and the  POEA rules  in relation to the  recruitment and employment of Filipino seafarers wherein the company or person   can be held criminally or administratively  liable.

The POEA’s revised rules was passed in accordance with the government’s policy,   among others, to uphold the dignity and fundamental human rights of Filipino seafarers navigating foreign seas, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

Other prohibited acts that involve loans  include (a)  withholding or denying travel or other pertinent documents from an applicant seafarer for monetary or financial considerations, or for any other reasons, other than those authorized under the Labor Code; (b)   withholding of seafarer’s salaries or remittances, SSS contributions and loan amortization or shortchanging/reduction thereof without justifiable reasons ; (c)  granting a loan to a seafarer with interest exceeding eight percent (8%) per annum which will be used for payment of legal and allowable fees and making the seafarer issue, either personally or through a guarantor or accommodation party, post-dated checks in relation to the said loan; and (d) refusing to condone or renegotiate a loan incurred by the seafarer after the latter’s employment contract has been prematurely terminated through no fault of his/her own.

Under  the AMWA,  any person found guilty of any of the prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Under the 2016 Revised POEA Rules and Regulations, penalties for  the  offenses may vary based on the frequency of violations from  suspension of license ( two months to two years)  to its cancellation on the fourth offense.

         

Money claims arising from recruitment violation may be awarded in addition to the administrative penalties imposed. In lieu of the penalty of suspension of license, the POEA may impose the penalty of fine which shall be computed at Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for every month of suspension. 

The penalty of cancellation of license shall be imposed by the POEA upon a respondent  found liable for committing an offense, regardless of the number or nature of charges, against five (5) or more workers in a single case.

All cases  shall be barred if not commenced or filed within three (3) years after such cause of action accrued.

(Atty. Gorecho heads the seafarers’ division of the  Sapalo Velez Bundang Bulilan  law offices. For comments, email info@sapalovelez.com, or call 09175025808 or 09088665786)

Escrow deposit in seafarers' cases

In terms of labor litigation,  “escrow deposit ” plays a significant role in  a seafarer's  favorable decision on his monetary claims.

Every labor dispute involves two opposing parties:  the worker on one side and the management on the other, involving monetary claims  like disability and death benefits, illegal dismissal awards as well as unpaid or underpayment of salaries and wages. 

A manning agency is required under   POEA Rules to  deposit in escrow with  a bank  the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php1 ,000,000.00) to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. These include recruitment violations, or claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino seafarers under the joint and solidary liability of the manning agency.

Labor litigation takes years before its finality. In most cases, the elevation of the records alone from the NLRC/NCMB to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court will take several years. The proceedings in the appellate court will entail further delay.  In cases of seafarers with medical conditions, some incur huge debts to sustain their medication. Others die before the decision by the Supreme Court is released. 

The prevailing party might  be unable to enjoy  the judgment award  after the lapse of time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to delay. Due to the longer years that they have to wait, without any leverage in prosecuting his monetary claims, chances are, the  seafarer bows to the demand of his employer to either drop his claim or accept a small settlement amount. 

To protect the seafarers, the escrow deposit  must  remain intact during the validity of license for a period of four (4) years and an additional of four ( 4) years if not renewed upon its expiration or should the license be revoked or otherwise cancelled for whatever legal grounds. In case the deposit in escrow is reduced, the Manning agency  shall replenish the same within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice by the POEA. The Bank  shall at all times advise the POEA whenever the escrow deposit is reduced or same is no longer intact. Failure to replenish  shall result in the suspension of license of the Manning agency without further notice.

The escrow deposit shall not be  released except upon proper authorization by the POEA .  The bank   shall pay the claims on a "first come-first served" basis and the Order of Garnishment that is first served upon the bank  shall be satisfied, irrespective of the date of the issuance of the writ of execution. If several claims are simultaneously presented on the same day, and the escrow deposit is not sufficient to pay the claims, the bank shall pay the claims on a pro-rata basis.

The bank  shall not be liable beyond whatever balance of the deposit in escrow.

Credibility of findings of company doctors

The findings of the  company-designated physician  do not always  bind the courts in determining the merits of compensation cases filed Filipino  seafarers.  

In most seafarer cases for disability or death benefits claims, one of the arguments often raised by the companies  or the insurance correspondents    is that they are not liable to pay benefits by pointing to the medical reports of the company-designated physician that the seafarer’s illness is not work-connected, that he is fit to work or that the compensation is limited to a lower amount based on a low disability grading.  They point out that   the POEA mandated that  the seafarer’s disability can only be assessed by the company-designated physician considering that the latter had the time and the opportunity to constantly monitor the health and physical condition of the seafarer

In the recent case of Magsaysay vs. Oliver Buenaventura ( G.R. No. 195878. January 10, 2018),   the seafarer  met an accident wherein  a mooring winch crushed his right hand. As a result, he suffered a fracture of the right first metacarpal bone and open fracture of the right second metacarpal  bone, which required  emergency  surgical procedures  both done in Japan and  he was later  medically repatriated. After six months, the company doctor declared him fit to work after undergoing conservative management, continuous rehabilitation physiotheraphy, and occupational therapy. He filed a case for disability benefits.

The Supreme Court denied the claims  for disability benefits of the seafarer as it stressed that  failure to refer the conflicting findings between the company-designated physician and the seafarer's physician of choice grants the former's medical opinion more weight and probative value  over the latter.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court noted that it does not mean that the judicial bodies  should adopt it hook, line and sinker as it may be set aside if it is shown that the diagnosis of the company-designated physician  is attended with clear bias, has no scientific basis or are not supported by the medical records of the seafarer. 

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The Court also pointed out in a case that “their findings cannot be taken as gospel truth” due to the proliferation of obviously biased company doctors whose loyalty rests completely upon the company they serve and these “are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of petitioners and certainly could not be considered independent”(Wallem vs.NLRC 318 SCRA 623,  United Philippine Lines, Inc. and/or Holland America Line, Inc., vs. Francisco D. Beseril, 487 SCRA 249).

Dubious Certificate of Fitness in disability claims

The Supreme Court warned companies from issuing dubious Certificate of Fitness which it described as “a ploy that aims to take advantage of the worker’s lack of sufficient legal knowledge and his desperate circumstances”

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of a young seafarer who sought payment of permanent total disability benefits for contracting bipolar disorder during his employment, an  illness that  was declared  work-related and aggravated by the harsh treatment he received from the ship officers (Career Shipmanagement vs. Eduardo Godinez, G.R. No. 206826, October 2, 2017)

The supreme Court emphasized the circumstances on how the alleged Certificate of Fitness for Work was  executed by the seafarer (during the medication process)   and was used by the company to serve as proof of his state of health in an effort to deny his claims for total disability benefits.

            

The  court considered  the seafarer’s  declaration as  not competent since he  is not a trained physician,  and it cannot take the place of the company-designated physician’s assessment required by law and the POEA contract

The Court warns against the continued use of underhanded tactics that undermine the interests of labor, damages the integrity of the legal profession, mock the judicial process as a whole, and insult the intelligence of the Court.  In prosecuting a client’s case, the Court reminded the company’s counsels that there are multiple ways of securing victory, other than through fabrication, prevarication, and guile.

The manner in which the seafarer  was dealt with in the proceedings, the Court emphasized,  evinces a perverse attempt to evade liability by fabricating evidence and utilizing objectionable and oppressive means and schemes to secure victory.  It constitutes an affront, not only to the Court, but to all honest workingmen earning a living through hard work and risking their lives for their families.

In a related case,     the fact that a Certification of Fitness was executed, it should no also t be considered as a bar in seafarer’s availment of second medical opinion from his personal doctor and later to seek relief from a legal forum.

               To adopt and paraphrase  the Supreme Court’s wisdom in Mercury Drug vs. Dayao, ( 202 Phil 424) , the company’s  contention that its employees fully understood what they signed when they executed the Certificate of Fitness  and that they should be bound by their voluntary commitment's is anachronistic in this time and age. The worker  is  at a disadvantage insofar as the contractual relationship is  concerned. Workers in our country do not have the luxury or freedom of  refusing to sign a Certificate of Fitness even when some terms and conditions of employment are not only onerous and inequitous but illegal. It is precisely because of this situation that the framers of the Constitution embodied the provisions on social justice (Section 6, Article II) and protection to labor (Section 9, Article II) in the Declaration of Principles And State Policies. It is pursuant to these constitutional mandates that the courts are ever vigilant to protect the rights of workers who are places in contractually disadvantageous positions and who sign waivers or provisions contrary to law and public policy.

 In labor jurisprudence, it is well-established that quitclaims and/or complete releases executed by the employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims arising from the unfair labor practice of the employer. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and, therefore, null and void. The acceptance of termination pay does not divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts. [3]

In the Cariño vs. ACCFA case (L-19808, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183)  , the Supreme Court  said "acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners did not relent their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur."

 In More Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC (366 Phil. 646, 653-654), the Court ruled that the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled. Quitclaims executed by the employees are thus commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the worker's legal rights, considering the economic disadvantage of the employee and the inevitable pressure upon him by financial necessity. Thus, it is never enough to assert that the parties have voluntarily entered into such a quitclaim. There are other requisites, to wit: (a) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (b) that the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (c) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

This principle was utilized In the case of Var-orient  Shipping  Co. vs. Flores (October 6, 2010 G.R. No. 161934  when  the Supreme Court took cognizance of the illegality of the Certification of Fitness to Work.   It noted that the Receipt and Quitclaim executed by the seafarer  lacks the elements of voluntariness and free will and, therefore, does not absolve employers  from liability in paying him the sickness wages and other monetary claims. A perusal of the provisions of the Receipt and Quitclaim shows that seafarer  would be releasing and discharging the employers  from all claims, demands, causes of action, and the like in an all-encompassing manner, including the fact that he had not contracted or suffered any illness or injury in the course of his employment and that he was discharged in good and perfect health. These stipulations clearly placed the seafarer  in a disadvantageous position vis-á-vis the employers .

The certificate of fitness to work executed by a seafarer  cannot prevail in the labor  cases since the worker,  untrained in the medical arts, is not in possession of sufficient knowledge to expertly asses his true and correct health status. For while a person can assess his general health, he cannot do so with respect to his medical condition which undoubtedly require a trained man learned in the medical arts, to properly diagnose and treat. It could not be said that a layman possess the requisite level of knowledge and expertise which took years of learning and experience for a trained cardiologist to acquire.  Therefore,    the  act of preying upon the ignorance of the petitioner must not be countenanced by our labor courts

Moreover,  it must be stressed that the POEA SEC recognizes the right of seafarers to seek a second opinion to contest the certification issued by the company doctor, in this case, the “fit to work” certification. To insist that the seafarer is barred from seeking opinion is tantamount to a violation of the POEA SEC’s terms and conditions. 

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[3] Cariño vs. ACCFA, L-19808, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183; Philippine Sugar Institute vs. CIR, L-13475, Sept. 29, 1960, 109 Phil. 452; Mercury Drug Co. vs. CIR, L-23357, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 694, 704.